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Abstract—We investigate two source coding problems with
secrecy constraints. In the first problem we consider real–time
fully secure transmission of a memoryless source. We show that
although classical variable–rate coding is not an option since the
lengths of the codewords leak information on the source, the key
rate can be as low as the average Huffman codeword length of the
source. In the second problem we consider causal source coding
with a fidelity criterion and side information at the decoder
and the eavesdropper. We show that when the eavesdropper has
degraded side information, it is optimal to first use a causal rate
distortion code and then encrypt its output with a key.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider two source coding scenarios in which an
encoder, referred to as Alice, transmits outcomes of a memory-
less source to a decoder, referred to as Bob. The comunnication
between Alice and Bob is intercepted by an eavesdropper,
referred to as Eve.
In the first scenario, we consider real–time communication
between Alice and Bob and require full secrecy, meaning that
the intercepted transmission does not leak any information
about the source. In the second scenario, we consider lossy
causal source coding when both Bob and Eve have access to
side information (SI). We require that Eve’s uncertainty about
the source given the intercepted signal and SI will be higher
than a certain threshold.
Real–time codes are a subclass of causal codes, as defined
by Neuhoff and Gilbert [1]. In [1], entropy coding is used
on the whole sequence of reproduction symbols, introducing
arbitrarily long delays. In the real–time case, entropy coding
has to be instantaneous, symbol–by–symbol (possibly taking
into account past transmitted symbols). It was shown in [1],
that for a discrete memoryless source (DMS), the optimal
causal encoder consists of time–sharing between no more than
two memoryless encoders. Weissman and Merhav [2] extended
[1] by including SI at the decoder, encoder or both.
Shannon [3] introduced the information-theoretic notion
of secrecy, where security is measured through the remain-
ing uncertainty about the message at the eavesdropper. This
information-theoretic approach of secrecy allows to consider
security issues at the physical layer, and ensures uncondition-
ally (regardless of the eavesdroppers computing power and
time) secure schemes, since it only relies on the statistical
properties of the system. Wyner introduced the wiretap channel
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in [4] and showed that it is possible to send information at a
positive rate with perfect secrecy as long as Eve’s channel is a
degraded version of the channel to Bob. When the channels are
clean, two approaches can be found in the literature of secure
communication. The first assumes that both Alice and Bob
agree on a secret key prior to the transmission of the source
(through a separate secure channel for example). The second
approach assumes that Bob and Eve (and possibly Alice) have
different versions of side information and secrecy is achieved
through this difference.
For the case of shared secret key, Shannon showed that in
order for the transmission of a DMS to be fully secure, the rate
of the key must be at least as large as the entropy of the source.
Yamamoto ([5] and references therein) studied various secure
source coding scenarios that include extension of Shannon’s
result to combine secrecy with rate–distortion theory. In both
[3],[5], when no SI is available, it was shown that separation is
optimal. Namely, using a source code followed by encryption
with the shared key is optimal. The other approach was
treated more recently by Prabhakaran and Ramchandran [6]
who considered lossless source coding with SI at both Bob
and Eve when there is no rate constraint between Alice and
Bob. It was shown that the Slepian-Wolf [7] scheme is not
necessarily optimal when the SI structure is not degraded.
Coded SI at Bob and SI at Alice where considered in [8].
These works were extended by Villard and Piantanida [9] to
the case where distortion is allowed and coded SI is available
to Bob. Merhav combined the two approaches with the wire–
tap channel [10]. Note that we mentioned only a small sample
of the vast literature on this subject.
In the works mentioned above, there were no constraints
on the delay and/or causality of the system. As a result, the
coding theorems of the above works introduced arbitrary long
delay and exponential complexity.
The practical need for fast and efficient encryption algo-
rithms for military and commercial applications along with
theoretical advances of the cryptology community, led to the
development of efficient encryption algorithms and standards
which rely on relatively short keys. However, the security of
these algorithms depend on computational complexity and the
intractability assumption of some hard problems. To the best
of our knowledge, there was no attempt so far to analyze the
performance of a real–time or causal secrecy system from an
information theoretic point of view.
The extension of Neuhoff and Gilbert’s result [1] to the
real–time case is straightforward and is done by replacing
the block entropy coding by instantaneous Huffman coding.
The resulting bitstream between the encoder and decoder is
composed of the Huffman codewords. However, this cannot
be done when secrecy is involved, even if only lossless
compression is considered. To see why, consider the case
where Eve intercepts a Huffman codeword and further assume
the bits of the codeword are encrypted with a one–time pad.
While the intercepted bits give no information on the encoded
symbol (since they are independent of it after the encryption),
the number of intercepted bits leaks information on the source
symbol. For example, if the codeword is short, Eve knows that
the encrypted symbol is one with a high probability (remember
that Eve knows the source statistics). This suggests that in
order to achieve full security, the lengths of the codewords
emitted by the encoder should be independent of the source.
In the last example, we assumed that Eve is informed on
how to parse the bitstream into separate codewords. This will
be the case, for example, when each codeword is transmitted
as a packet over a network and the packets are intercepted by
Eve. Even if the bits are meaningless to Eve, she still knows
the number of bits in each packet. We show in the sequel that,
albeit the above example, the key rate can be as low as the
average Huffman codeword length (referred hereafter as the
Huffman length) of the source. Full secrecy, in this case, will
be achieved by randomization at the encoder, which can be
removed by Bob. In contrast to the works mentioned above,
our results here are not asymptotic.
We also investigate the scenario where Eve doesn’t have
parsing information and cannot parse the bitstream into the
separate codewords. This will be the case, for example if Eve
acquires only the whole bitstream, not necessarily in real–time,
without the log of the network traffic. Alternatively, it acquires
an encrypted file after it was saved to the disk. In this case,
when we assume that the length of transmission is infinite, we
show that that the best achievable rates of both the key and the
transmission are given by the Huffman length of the source.
In contrast to the results described in the previous paragraph,
the results in this scenario are asymptotic in the sense that
the probability that the system is not secure is zero when
the transmission length is infinite. Note that the length of the
transmission was not an issue in the mentioned previous works
since block coding was used. Therefore, the block length was
known a-priori to Eve and leaked no information.
In the following two sections we deal with the real–time and
causal setting, receptively. Each section begins with a formal
definition of the relevant problem.
II. REAL–TIME FULL SECRECY
We begin with notation conventions. Capital letters repre-
sent scalar random variables (RV’s), specific realizations of
them are denoted by the corresponding lower case letters
and their alphabets – by calligraphic letters. For i < j (i,
j - positive integers), xji will denote the vector (xi, . . . , xj),
where for i = 1 the subscript will be omitted. For two random
variables X,Y , with alphabets X ,Y , respectively and joint
probability distribution {p(x, y)}, the average instantaneous
codeword length of X conditioned on Y = y will be given by
L(X |Y = y)
△
= min
l(·)∈AX
{∑
x∈X
P (x|y)l(x)
}
. (1)
where AX is the set of all possible length functions l :
X → Z+ that satisfy Kraft’s inequality for alphabet of size
|X |. L(X |Y = y) is obtained by designing a Huffman code
for the probability distribution P (x|y). With the same abuse
of notation common for entropy, we let L(X |Y ) denote the
expectation of L(X |Y = y) with respect to the randomness
of Y . The Huffman length of X is given by L(X).
In this section, the following real-time source coding prob-
lem is considered: Alice, wishes to losslessly transmit the
output of a DMS X with probability mass function PX(x)
to Bob. The communication between Alice and Bob is inter-
cepted by Eve. Alice and Bob operate without delay. When
Alice observes Xt she encodes it by an instantaneous code
and transmits the codeword to Bob through a clean digital
channel. Bob decodes the codeword and reproduces Xt. A
communication stage is defined to start when the source emits
Xt and ends when Bob reproduces Xt, i.e., Bob cannot use
future transmissions to calculate Xt. We will assume that both
Alice and Bob have access to a completely random binary
sequence, u = (u1, u2, . . .), which is independent of the
data and will be referred to as the key. Let m1,m2, . . . ,mn,
mi ∈ N be a non decreasing sequence of positive integers. At
stage t, Alice uses lKt
△
= mt −mt−1 bits that were not used
so far from the key sequence. Let Kt
△
= (umt−1+1, . . . , umt)
denote the stage t key. The parsing of the key sequence up
to stage t should be the same at Alice and Bob. This can be
done “on the fly” through the data already known to both Alice
and Bob from the previous stages. We define the key rate to
be RK = lim supn→∞ 1n
∑n
t=1 ElKt . We will also assume
that Alice has access, at each stage, to a private source of
randomness {Vt}, which is i.i.d and independent of the source
and the key. Neither Bob nor Eve have access to {Vt}.
Let Z be the set of all finite length binary strings. Denote
Alice’s output at stage t by Zt ∈ Z and let Bt denote the
unparsed sequence, containing lBt bits, that were transmitted
so far up to the end of stage t. The rate of the encoder is
defined by R △= lim supn→∞ 1nElBn .
Given the keys up to stage t, Kt, Bob can parse Bk into
Z1, . . . , Zt for any k ≥ t. The legitimate decoder is thus a
sequence functions Xt = gt(Kt, Zt).
As discussed in the Introduction, we will treat two security
models. In the first model we will assume that Eve can detect
when each stage starts, i.e., it can parse Bt into Z1, . . . , Zt.
In the second model, we will assume that Eve intercepts the
whole bitstream Bn (assuming a total of n stages) but has no
information on actual parsing of Bn into Z1, . . . , Zn. These
models are treated in the following two subsections.
A. Eve Has Parsing Information
In this subsection we assume that Eve can parse Bn
into Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn. In order for the system to be fully
secure, following [3], we will require that for any k,m, n,
P (Xk|Znm) = P (X
k), i.e., acquiring any portion of the
transmission leaks no information on the source, which was
not known to Eve in advance.
The most general real–time encoder is a sequence of func-
tions Zt = ft(Kt, Vt, Xt). In this paper, we will treat only a
subclass of encoders that satisfy the Markov chain
Xt ↔ Z
t ↔ Kt−1. (2)
Namely, given the past and current encoder outputs, the current
source symbol, Xt, does not reduce the uncertainty regarding
the past keys. We claim that this constraint, in the framework
of complete security is relatively benign and, in fact, any
encoder that calculates a codeword (possibly using the whole
history of the source and keys, i.e., with the most general
encoder structure), say Zˆt, and then outputs Zt = Zˆt ⊕ Kt
will satisfy this constraint. Such a structure seems natural for
one–time pad encryption. Another example of encoders that
will satisfy such a constraint are encoders with the structure
Zt = ft(Kt, Vt, Xt, Z
t−1) (we omit the proof this structure
will induce the Markov chain due to space limitations). The
main result of this subsection is the following theorem:
Theorem I. There exists a pair of fully secure real–time
encoder and decoder if and only if RK ≥ L(X).
This theorem is in the spirit of the result of [3], where
the entropy is replaced by the Huffman length due to the real-
time constraint. As discussed in the introduction, variable–rate
coding is not an option when we want the communication to
be fully secure. This means that the encoder should either
output constant length (short) blocks or have the transmission
length independent of the source symbol in some other way.
Clearly, with constant length blocks, the rate of a lossless
encoder cannot be as low as L(X) for all possible memoryless
sources. The rate of the key, however, can be as low as L(X).
In the proof of the direct part of Theorem I, we show that a
constant rate encoder with block length corresponding to the
longest Huffman codeword achieves this key rate. The padding
is done by random bits from the encoder’s private source
of randomness. Note, however, that if both the key rate and
encoder rate are log |X |, lossless fully secure communication
is trivially possible. Although Theorem I does not give a lower
bound on the rate of the encoder, the above discussion suggests
that there is a trade-off between the key rate and the possible
encoder rate that will allow secure lossless communication.
Namely, there is a set of optimal rate pairs, (R,RK), which
are possible. We prove Theorem I in the following subsections.
1) Converse: For every lossless encoder–decoder pair that
satisfies the security constraint and (2), we lower bound the
key rate as follows:
n∑
t=1
ElKt =
n∑
t=1
L(Kt)
≥
n∑
t=1
L(Kt|K
t−1, Zt) (3)
=
n∑
t=1
L(Kt, Xt|K
t−1, Zt) (4)
≥
n∑
t=1
L(Xt|K
t−1, Zt) (5)
=
n∑
t=1
L(Xt|Z
t) (6)
=
n∑
t=1
L(Xt) (7)
= nL(X). (8)
The first equality is true since the key bits are incompressible
and therefore the Huffman length is the same as the number
of key bits. (3) is true since conditioning reduces the Huffman
length (the simple proof of this is omitted). (4) follows since
Xt is a function of (Kt, Zt) (the decoder’s function) and
therefore, given (Kt−1, Zt), the code for Kt also reveals Xt.
(5) is true since with the same conditioning on (Kt−1, Zt),
the instantaneous code of (Kt, Xt) cannot be shorter then
the instantaneous code of Xt. (6) is due to (2) and finally,
(7) is true by the security model. We therefore showed that
RK ≥ L(X).
2) Direct: We construct an encoder–decoder pair that are
fully secure with RK = L(X). Let lmax denote the longest
Huffman codeword of X . We know that lmax ≤ |X | − 1. The
encoder output will always be lmax bits long and will be built
from two fields. The first field will be the Huffman codeword
for the observed source symbol Xt. Denote its length by l(Xt).
This codeword is then XORed with l(Xt) key bits. The second
field will be composed of lmax−l(Xt) random bits (taken from
the private source of randomness) that will pad the encrypted
Huffman codeword to be of length lmax. Regardless of the
specific source output, Eve sees constant length codewords
composed of random uniform bits. Therefore no information
about the source is leaked by the encoder outputs. When Bob
receives such a block, it starts XORing it with key bits until
it detects a valid Huffman codeword. The rest of the bits are
ignored. Obviously, the key rate which is needed is L(X).
B. Eve Has No Parsing Information
In this subsection, we relax our security assumptions and
assume that Eve observes the whole transmission from Alice
to Bob, but has no information on how to parse the bitstream
Bn into Z1, . . . , Zn. Although it is not customary to limit
the eavesdropper in any way in information–theoretic security,
this limitation has a practical motivation, as discussed in the
Introduction.
We will require that the following holds for every t and
every x ∈ X :
P (Xt = x|Bn) −−−−→
n→∞
PX(Xt = x) a.s. (9)
This means that when the bitstream is long enough, the
eavesdropper does not learn from it anything about the source
symbols. Note that the encoder from Section (II-A2) trivially
satisfies this constraint since it was a constant block length
encoder and the bits within the block where encrypted by
a one–time pad. We will see that with the relaxed secrecy
requirement we can reduce the rate of the encoder to be the
same as the rate of the key. In this section we deal with
encoders that satisfy Xt ↔ Bn ↔ Kt−1. The discussion that
followed the constraint (2) is valid here as well. We have the
following theorem:
Theorem II. There exists a lossless encoder–decoder pair
that satisfies the secrecy constraints (9) if and only if R ≥
L(X), RK ≥ L(X).
The fact that R ≥ L(X) is trivial since we deal with a real
time lossless encoder. However, unlike the case of Theorem
I, here it can be achieved along with RK ≥ L(X). The
proof of the bound on RK follows the proof of the previous
section up to (6) by replacing Zt by Bn. We have: RK ≥
1
n
∑n
t=1 L(Xt|Bn). Now, since P (Xt|Bn) → P (Xt) a.s.
we have that L(Xt|Bn) → L(Xt) a.s.. The direct part
of the proof is achieved by separation. We first encode Xt
using a Huffman code and then XOR the resulting bits with
a one time pad. Therefore, both the encoder and key rate
of this scheme are equal to L(X). We need to show that
(9) holds. We outline the idea here. The bits of Bn are
independent of Xt since we encrypted them with a one-time
pad. Let lBn represent the number of bits in Bn. Since Bn is
encrypted we have Xt → lBn → Bn. Therefore, we have that
P (Xt|Bn) = P (Xt|Bn, lBn) = P (Xt|lBn). From the law of
large numbers, lBn → nL(X) a.s. But if lBn = nL(X) then
lBn leaks no information about Xt (since this nL(X) is known
a-priori to Eve). The full proof resembles the martingale proof
of the strong law of large numbers and can be found in [11].
Discussion: Unlike Theorem I, Theorem II addresses the rate
of the encoder as well as the rate of the key. The result here
is asymptotic since only when the bitsream is long enough we
have the independence of Xt from Bn. It can be shown that
the probability that Bn reveals information on Xt vanishes
exponentially fast with n. Note that if instead of defining the
security constraint as in (9), we would have required that for
every n, t, P (Xt|Bn) = P (Xt) then a counterpart of Theorem
1 will hold here. However, the encoder will, as in the direct
part of Theorem I proof, work in constant rate.
III. CAUSAL RATE DISTORTION WITH SECURITY
CONSTRAINTS AND SI
In this section, we extend the work of [1],[2] to include
secrecy constraints. We consider the following source model:
Alice, Bob, and Eve observe sequences of random vari-
ables Xn, Y n, and Wn respectively which take values over
discrete alphabets X ,Y,W , respectively. (Xn, Y n,Wn) are
distributed according to a joint distribution p(xn, yn, wn) =∏n
t=1 P (xt)P (yt|xt)P (wt|yt), i.e., the triplets (Xt, Yt,Wt)
are created by a DMS with the structure X ↔ Y ↔ W .
(Y n,Wn) are the SI sequences seen by Bob and Eve respec-
tively. Unlike [6], [9], we will treat in this paper only the case
of degraded SI. This model covers the scenarios where no SI
is available or is available only to Bob as special cases. Both
Alice and Bob have access to a shared secret key denoted by
K , K ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . . ,Mk} which is independent of the source.
Let Xˆ be Bob’s reproduction alphabet and let d : X ×
Xˆ → [0,∞), dmin = minx,xˆ d(x, xˆ). Finally, let d(xn, xˆn) =
1
n
∑n
t=1 d(xt, xˆt). Alice encodes Xn, using the key, K , and
creates a bit sequence Z = Z1, Z2 . . . which is transmitted
through a clean channel to Bob. Bob uses (K,Y n,Z) to create
an estimate sequence, Xˆn, such that Ed(Xn, Xˆn) ≤ D. We
allow the decoder to fail and declare an error with a vanishing
probability of error. Namely, for every δ > 0 there exists n
large enough such that the probability of error is less than δ.
We assume that Eve intercepts the transmitted bits, Z.
The security of the system is measured by the uncertainty
of Eve with regard to the source sequence, measured by
1
n
H(Xn|Wn,Z). As in [1], we call the cascade of encoder
and decoder a reproduction coder. We say that a reproduction
function is causal relative to the source if
Xˆt = ft(X
∞
−∞,K) = ft(X˜
∞
−∞,K) if Xt−∞ = X˜t−∞ (10)
Note that we did not restrict the use of the key to be causal in
any sense. Moreover, this definition does not rule out arbitrary
delays and real–time is not considered here. We will only
treat the SI model covered in [2] where Y n in not used in
the reproduction of Xˆn but can be used for the compression
of Xˆn. More complicated models will be treated in [11].
A causal reproduction coder is characterized by a family of
reproduction functions {fk}∞k=1, such that the reproduction Xˆk
of the kth source output Xk is given by Xˆk = fk(K,Xk). If
the decoder declares an error, we will have Xˆk 6= fk(K,Xk).
The probability of this event is the probability of decoder
error. The average distortion of an encoder-decoder pair with
an induced reproduction coder {fk} is defined by
d({fk}) = lim sup
n→∞
E
[
d(Xn, Xˆn)
]
. (11)
The encoder’s rate is defined by R = 1
n
lim supn→∞H(Z).
Let R denote the set of positive quadruples (R,RK , D, h)
such that for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there
exists an encoder and a decoder whose probability of error is
less than δ, inducing a causal reproduction coder satisfying:
1
n
H(Z) ≤ R+ ǫ (12)
1
n
H(K) ≤ RK + ǫ (13)
1
n
n∑
t=1
Eρ(Xt, Xˆt) ≤ D + ǫ (14)
1
n
H(Xn|Wn,Z) ≥ h− ǫ (15)
Let rx|y(D) be the optimum performance theoretically attain-
able function (OPTA) from [2] for the case where the SI is
available only at the decoder. Namely,
rx|y(D) = min
f :Ed(X,f(X))≤D
H(f(X)|Y ) (16)
and let rx|y(·) denote the lower convex envelope of rx|y(·).
We have the following theorem.
Theorem III. (R,Rk, D, h) ∈ R if and only if
h ≤ H(X |W ), D ≥ Dmin, R ≥ rx|y(D),
Rk ≥ h−H(X |W ) + rx|y(D). (17)
If h−H(X |W ) + rx|y(D) ≤ 0, no encryption is needed.
It is seen from the theorem, that separation holds in this
case. The direct part of this proof is therefore straightforward:
First, quantize the source within distortion D by the scheme
given in [2]. As was shown in [2], this step requires time-
sharing no more than two memoryless quantizers. Now use
Slepian–Wolf encoding to encode the resulting quantized
symbols given the SI at Bob. Finally, use a one–time pad of
n(h −H(X |W ) + rx|y(D)) bits on the block describing the
bin number.
We now proceed to prove the converse part, starting with
lower bounding the encoding rate. For any k, let X˜k =
fk(K,X
k). X˜k are equal to Xˆk when there is no decoding
error. Since the probability of decoder failure vanishes, we
have from Fano’s inequality ([12]) that for every ǫ > 0, there
exists n large enough such that H(X˜n|K,Y n,Z) ≤ nǫ.
For n large enough and every encoder and decoder pair that
induce a causal reproduction coder and satisfy (12)-(15) the
following chain of inequalities hold:
nR ≥ H(Z)
≥ H(Z|K,Y n)−H(Z|K, X˜n, Y n)
= I(X˜n;Z|K,Y n)
= H(X˜n|K,Y n)−H(X˜n|K,Y n,Z)
≥ H(X˜n|K,Y n)− nǫ (18)
=
n∑
t=1
H(X˜t|K, X˜
t−1, Y n)− nǫ
≥
n∑
t=1
H(X˜t|K, X˜
t−1, Xt−1, Y n)− nǫ
=
n∑
t=1
H(X˜t|K,X
t−1, Y n)− nǫ
=
n∑
t=1
H(ft(X
t−1,K,Xt)|K,X
t−1, Y n)− nǫ (19)
where (18) follows from Fano’s inequality. From here, using
the independent of the key and the source and following the
steps used in [2, Appendix, eq. A.11] we can show that R ≥
rx|y(D). The key rate can be lower bounded as follows:
nRK = H(K)
≥ H(K|Z,Wn)
= I(Xn;K|Wn,Z) +H(K|Xn,Wn,Z)
= H(Xn|Wn,Z)−H(Xn|K,Wn,Z) +H(K|Xn,Wn,Z)
≥ nh−H(Xn|K,Wn,Z) +H(K|Xn,Wn,Z)
≥ nh−H(Xn|K,Wn,Z) (20)
We continue by focusing on H(Xn|K,Wn,Z):
H(Xn|K,Wn,Z)
= I(Xn, Y n|K,Wn,Z) +H(Xn|K,Y n,Wn,Z)
≤ H(Y n|Wn)−H(Y n|K,Xn,Wn,Z) +H(Xn|K,Y n,Z)
(21)
= H(Y n|Wn)−H(Y n|Xn,Wn) +H(Xn|K,Y n,Z)
(22)
= I(Xn;Y n|Wn) +H(Xn|K,Y n, X˜n,Z)
+ I(Xn; X˜n|K,Y n,Z)
≤ nI(X ;Y |W ) +H(Xn|K,Y n, X˜n,Z) + nǫ (23)
≤ n(H(X |W )−H(X |Y )) +H(Xn|K,Y n, X˜n) (24)
where in (21) we used the degraded structure of the source.
(22) is true since Z is a function of (K,Xn) and K is
independent of the souce. (23) is true by Fano’s inequality
and the fact that X˜n is a function of (K,Xn). Focusing on
the last term of (24) we have
H(Xn|K,Y n, X˜n) = H(Xn|K,Y n)− I(Xn; X˜n|K,Y n)
= nH(X |Y )− I(Xn; X˜n|K,Y n)
= nH(X |Y )−H(X˜n|K,Y n) +H(X˜n|K,Xn, Y n)
≤ nH(X |Y )−H(X˜n|K,Y n) + nǫ (25)
≤ nH(X |Y )− rx|y(D) + ǫ (26)
where (25) is true since Xˆn is a function of K,Xn through
the reproduction coders and Fano’s inequality. Finally the last
line follows from (18). Combining (26) with (24) into (20) we
showed that RK ≥ h−H(X |W ) + rx|y(D).
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